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Abstract
This paper studies how producers’ idiosyncratic risks a¤ect an industry’s aggregate
dynamics in an environment where certainty equivalence fails. In the model, producers
can place workers in two types of jobs, organized and temporary. Workers are less produc-
tive in temporary jobs, but creating an organized job requires an irreversible investment
of managerial resources. Increasing productivity risk raises the value of an unexercised
option to create an organized job. Losing this option is one cost of immediate organized
job creation, so an increase in its value induces substitution towards cheaper temporary
jobs. Because they are costless to create and destroy, a producer using temporary jobs can
be more ‡exible, responding more to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. If all of an
industry’s producers adapt to heightened idiosyncratic risk in this way, the industry as a
whole can respond more to a given aggregate shock. This insight is used to better under-
stand the observation from the U.S. manufacturing sector that groups of plants displaying
high idiosyncratic variability also have large aggregate ‡uctuations.(JEL E00, L00, J00)
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This paper analyzes how idiosyncratic risk a¤ects individual and aggregate employment dy-
namics when producers can choose the ‡exibility of their input use. Consider the problem of a
producer that can place workers in two types of jobs, organized and temporary. Workers are less
productive in temporary jobs, but creating an organized job requires an irreversible investment
of managerial resources. Increasing productivity risk raises the value of an unexercised option to
create an organized job. Losing this option is one cost of immediate organized job creation. An
increase in option value induces substitution towards cheaper temporary jobs. Because they are
costless to create and destroy, a producer using temporary jobs can be more responsive to both
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Therefore, increased idiosyncratic risk can raise a producer’s
observed ‡exibility. If all of an industry’s producers respond to heightened idiosyncratic risk
in this way, the industry as a whole can display greater ‡exibility, responding more to a given
aggregate shock.
We develop this intuition analytically in a simpli…ed setting with risk lasting one period. To
assess its robustness and quantitative importance for aggregate dynamics, we calibrate, solve,
and simulate an industry equilibrium model. We use Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh’s (1996)
job creation and destruction data for U.S. manufacturing plants of di¤erent ages and in di¤erent
four-digit industries to calibrate our model and evaluate its behavior. These observations are
useful for our purposes because both idiosyncratic risk and aggregate dynamics vary signi…cantly
across plants in di¤erent industries and at di¤erent stages of the life cycle.
Our analysis builds onCampbell and Fisher’s (1999) model of acompetitive industry ofplants
subject to proportional costs of job creation and destruction and idiosyncratic productivity risk.
Transitory movements in the real product wage drive aggregate ‡uctuations. A distinguishing
feature of that model is its ability to reproduce the U.S. manufacturing sector’s greater use of job
destruction relative to job creation to accommodate transitory employment changes. To that
framework, we incorporate temporary jobs, as in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Cabrales
and Hopenhayn (1997), and a simple life-cycle in which plants exogenously exit and are replaced
at a constant rate. New plants begin their lives with high productivity risk, and as a plant ages
2its productivity risk declines. These assumptions are consistent with the higher observed average
rates of job creation and destruction among young plants. As detailed in Campbell and Fisher
(2000), our industry equilibrium framework can be interpreted as a model of general equilibrium.
A consistent pattern in the U.S. manufacturing sector’s gross job ‡ow data is that employ-
ment aggregates become more variable when producers face greater idiosyncratic risk. This
is true whether we compare plants of di¤erent ages or look across four-digit industries. The
time-series variances of young plants’ aggregate job creation, destruction, and growth rates are
greater than those of their older counterparts. Job creation, destruction, and growth all vary
more in four-digit industries with high idiosyncratic risk, even after controlling for the indus-
try’s parent two-digit industry. Our model economy replicates these …ndings, because greater
idiosyncratic risk induces plants to use more temporary jobs, which increases both individual
and aggregate ‡exibility.
For the case of a single investment project which is costly to start and shut down, Dixit
(1989) demonstrated that increasing risk induces delay in both decisions by increasing the value
of the option to adjust investment in the future. This paper shows how these option value
considerations induce changes in producers’ ‡exibility and impact aggregate dynamics. Increas-
ing the incentive for an individual producer to delay costly job creation and destruction need
not dampen aggregate ‡uctuations. In fact, our results point to the conclusion that increas-
ing idiosyncratic risk increases producers’ ‡exibility and ampli…es their responses to aggregate
shocks. Our application of these results focuses on aggregate employment dynamics, but the
same approach can be used to study producers’ other input choices, including capital and in-
ventories. For example, if producers can substitute between general purpose machinery and
illiquid special purpose machinery, increasing idiosyncratic risk can increase the variance of ag-
gregate investment by changing its composition. In general, our results suggest that the increase
in microeconomic turbulence described by Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998), Comín (2000) and
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2000) will amplify macroeconomic responses to a given
aggregate shock.
Our characterization of the di¤erences between young and old plants’ employment dynamics
is related to earlier research by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein
3(1994) which documents small and large …rms’ distinct inventory adjustment patterns following
contractionary monetary policy. Gertler and Gilchrist …nd that small …rms’ inventories contract
substantially following a monetary tightening, while large …rms’ inventories expand mildly. They
interpret this as re‡ecting the relative inability of small …rms to take on debt as their balance
sheets deteriorate in a recession. For large …rms with virtually unimpeded access to credit
markets, these balance sheet e¤ects are assumed to be negligible. Kashyap, et al …nd similar
results for …rms distinguished by bond-market rating status. Firms with no bond rating tend
to be small, so these results reinforce those of Gertler and Gilchrist.
To the extent that small …rms tend to operate young plants, this …nancial theory o¤ers
another potential explanation for young and old plants’ di¤erent aggregate employment dynam-
ics. However, this theory does not explain the complete dynamics of young and old plants’
employment data. Theoretically, the asymmetry between small and large …rms should only be
important during aggregate downturns, when balance sheets of small …rms are already weak.
Gertler and Gilchrist and Kashyap et al verify this prediction in their data. In particular, small
and large …rms’ inventories and short-term borrowing do not respond di¤erently to monetary
disturbances if the economy is already expanding. However, in the employment data, young
plants’ greater volatility is most evident during aggregate expansions. This highlights the need
for a more complete explanation for young and old producers’ di¤erent dynamic behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we empirically
characterize the relationship between plants’ idiosyncratic risks and aggregate employment dy-
namics. In Section 3, we develop analytic solutions to a producer’s job creation problem in a
simpli…ed setting. We use this to develop economic intuition regarding the impact of idiosyn-
cratic risk on producers’ responses to aggregate shocks. In Section 4 we present a more general
model useful for quantitative analysis. In Section 5 we study a calibrated version of this model
and compare its observable behavior to the data. Section 6 concludes.
42. Evidence on Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Dynamics
This section provides an empirical basis for evaluating our theory of idiosyncratic risk, producer
‡exibility, and aggregate employment dynamics. Our data source is Davis, Haltiwanger, and
Schuh’s (1996) (hereafter DHS) observations of job creation and destruction rates for the U.S.
manufacturing sector. For a given population of plants, the rate of job creation in a period is
de…ned as the total number of jobs added since the previous period at plants that increased
employment, divided by the average of total employment in the current and previous periods.
The rate of job destruction is similarly de…ned in terms of employment losses at shrinking plants.
The di¤erence between job creation and destruction is the rate of job growth. DHS propose
using the sum of job creation and destruction rates as a measure of job reallocation across plants.
We follow their terminology and refer to this sum as the job reallocation rate.
A well known characteristic of these data is that industries’ rates of job creation and de-
struction exceed those necessary to implement observed net job growth. This implies that jobs
are continually being reallocated across plants within the same industry. DHS document that
this is the case even when looking at very narrowly de…ned (four-digit) industries within speci…c
geographic regions, so this reallocation does not re‡ect movements between industries within a
broadly de…ned sector. Rather, the high rates of job creation and destruction seem to re‡ect
plants’ idiosyncratic risks and the resulting heterogeneity in their labor demand within nar-
rowly de…ned industries. For this reason, these data are particularly useful for examining how
idiosyncratic risk is related to aggregate dynamics.
We begin by comparing the aggregate employment dynamics of young and old manufactur-
ing plants, because previous empirical work indicates that young plants face more risk than
their older counterparts. We then characterize the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and
aggregate employment dynamics across four-digit manufacturing industries. For this analysis,
we measure idiosyncratic risk faced by an industry’s plants using its job creation and destruction
data.
52.1. Employment Dynamics over the Plant Life–Cycle
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1987) used plant-level employment observations to examine
how the employment growth process changes as a plant ages. A robust …nding of this study is
that the cross-sectional variance of plant employment growth rates declines signi…cantly with
age. Jovanovic’s (1982) industry dynamics model replicates this …nding because plants face less
productivity risk as they age and learn about their production technology. This model suggests
interpreting the decline in the variance of employment growth with plant age as a consequence of
falling idiosyncratic risk. This risk need not be directly connected to the production process. A
decline in risk regarding demand for a plant’s speci…c product could also generate the observed
variance decline. Nevertheless, not all models generate a direct connection between idiosyncratic
risk and the variance of employment growth. In the presence of labor adjustment costs, both the
risks the plant faces and its adjustment technology in‡uence realized employment variability. If
a plants’ adjustment costs exogenously increase as it ages, then the variance of its employment
growth will fall even if the risks it faces do not change. Subject to this caveat, we identify young
plants as “high-risk” in comparison to their older counterparts for our empirical analysis.
For our comparison of young and old plants’ employment dynamics, we use DHS’s quarterly
job creation and destruction series for plants in three di¤erent age categories. DHS (p. 225)
recommend aggregating the two categories that include the youngest establishments, and we do
this here. We refer to this combination as ‘young’ plants. These plants are typically less than
10 years old and account for 22:5% of total employment on average over the sample period.1
We refer to the remaining plants as ‘old’ plants.2 To seasonally adjust the time series, we …rst
regressed each series against a series of quarterly dummies. Our seasonally adjusted series is
then the sum of the raw series’ average value and the residuals from this regression.
Figure 1 plots the rates of job growth for young and old plants separately over our sample
period, 1972:II to 1988:IV. The vertical lines are the business cycle peaks and troughs, as de…ned
1We aggregate the two youngest catagories by adding their job creation and destruction rates after weighting
them by their total employment shares. We then divide the results by the sum of the two groups’ employment
shares.
2Because of the sample design of the underlying data source, the threshold between young and old changes
over time. The minimum age of an old establishment is at least 9 years and at most 13 years. These changes
only occur at the end of a year.
6by the NBER.3 This …gure illustrates that employment growth at young plants is typically higher
than at old plants and visibly more variable, especially in the periods between recessions. This
excess variability of young plants between recessions was highlighted in the introduction as
suggesting that factors other than the balance sheet e¤ects emphasized by Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) and Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) may be important for understanding the dynamics
of young and old plants.
The top panel of Table 1 reports the sample means of the job growth, creation, destruction,
and reallocation rates for young and old plants separately, as well as for the U.S. manufacturing
sector as a whole. The bottom panel reports sample standard deviations and some selected
sample correlations. As Figure 1 suggests, young plants’ average job growth rate is substantially
higher than that for old plants, 0:90% versus ¡0:70%. More importantly the young plants’ job
growth rate has a higher sample standard deviation than that of old plants, 2:32% versus 1:81%.
A Wald test (not reported) rejects the hypothesis that the underlying variances are the same
for young and old plants at a very high level of con…dence. Thus, we observe that job growth
at young plants as a group displays signi…cantly more time series variability. Consideration of
the other statistics in Table 1 reinforces this impression of greater variability at young plants.
Young plants’ average reallocation rate is much higher than that of old plants, 14:1% versus
9:8% (also statistically signi…cant), as we would expect if young plants faced more idiosyncratic
risk. Job creation, destruction, and reallocation all vary more over time for young plants. This
is particularly the case for job creation. Its standard deviation is 1:66% for young plants and
only 0:71% for old plants.
Another feature of this data, focused on by DHS, is the relative variability of job creation and
destruction. For the U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole, the variance ratio of job destruction
and job creation equals 2:89, so job destruction ‡uctuates much more than job creation. This
statistic has been the subject of considerable theoretical attention, because models in which
heterogeneous plants can be aggregated into a well-de…ned representative producer typically
3The NBER’s dates of business cycle peaks and troughs are expressed as monthly dates. The usual transfor-
mation to quarterly dates is somewhat problematic given the non-standard quarterly timing of the job creation
and destruction data as described in the technical appendix of DHS. The only change to the standard dating
convention is that the March 1975 trough is assigned to 1975, second quarter.
7imply that job creation and destruction vary equally. The variance ratio is also considerably
greater than one for old plants (see Table 1), which is as expected because old plants account
for the majority of manufacturing employment. A more interesting …nding, …rst noted by DHS,
is that young plants’ job creation and destruction rates have approximately equal variances.
Theoretical approaches to the empirical failure of the representative producer model have fo-
cused on job search and matching frictions (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)), asymmetries in
aggregate driving processes (Caballero (1992), Foote (1998)), and employment adjustment costs
(Campbell and Fisher (2000)). The failure of young plants’ dynamics to reproduce a variance
ratio signi…cantly above one challenges these theories much as the high variance ratio for manu-
facturing as a whole originally cast doubt on the representative producer paradigm. Examining
this aspect of young and old plants’ di¤erent aggregate dynamics is therefore a useful way to
evaluate our theory.
The job creation and destruction series for young and old plants that we analyze here do
not distinguish between employment changes due to plant births and deaths and the expansion
and contraction of plants which simply continue operation, but DHS report job creation and
destruction statistics separately for entering and exiting plants. The theoretical analysis we
outlined in the introduction does not necessarily have strong implications for producers’ use of
entry and exit to adjust employment, but it may be of interest to determine whether or not young
and old plants systematically use these margins di¤erently. The data seem ambiguous about
whether or not the asymmetry between young and old plants primarily represents the asymmetric
behavior of plant births (which by construction are young) and plant deaths, depending on the
particular variable in question and the data’s periodicity. Using quarterly data, the job growth
rates for young and old plants look much more symmetric if births and deaths are excluded,
but the analogous annual job growth data (not presented here) displays strong asymmetries
between young and old plants. Regardless of the data’s periodicity, the job creation rate of
continuing young plants has a larger variance than that of continuing old plants. However, the
job destruction rates at young and old continuing plants have approximately equal variances in
both quarterly and annual data. We conclude that the greater variance of young plants’ job
‡ows does not exclusively represent their di¤erent use of entry and exit.
82.2. Cross-Industry Evidence on Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Dynamics
The pace of job reallocation varies greatly across four-digit manufacturing industries. To the
extent that these di¤erences re‡ect the varying degree of idiosyncratic risk these industries’
producers face, a comparison across industries can provide more evidence regarding the im-
pact of idiosyncratic risk on aggregate employment dynamics. Of course, industries di¤er along
more than just one dimension. Their plants also operate di¤erent production and adjustment
technologies. Most importantly, industries clearly vary in their exposure to aggregate distur-
bances such as oil-price shocks (for energy intensive industries) and monetary policy shocks (for
durable goods industries). It is possible to control for exposure to macroeconomic disturbances,
but these other industry characteristics are di¢cult to measure. Nevertheless, if the impact of
idiosyncratic risk on producer ‡exibility and aggregate dynamics is quantitatively important, it
should manifest itself in a cross-industry comparison, in spite of these additional complicating
factors.
To carry out this comparison, we use DHS’s job creation and destruction series for 446 four-
digit industries. With these data, we estimate linear regressions in which the sample standard
deviations of job growth, creation, destruction, and reallocation are explained using a measure
of the industry’s idiosyncratic risk and dummy variables for all two-digit industries. We intend
these dummy variables to control for each industry’s exposure to macroeconomic disturbances.
Unlike in the comparison of young and old plants, we have little guidance from the liter-
ature regarding which industries’ plants are exposed to more idiosyncratic risk. We base our
measure of risk on the available job creation and destruction data. This poses di¢culties since
it is possible to generate the result we expect (i.e., time-series variability is positively related
to idiosyncratic risk) spuriously using job reallocation to measure idiosyncratic risk. To see
why, suppose counterfactually that the industries in our data were each populated by a large
number of identical representative producers. These plants would face no idiosyncratic risk, so
the industries’ job reallocation rates would all equal the absolute values of the representative
producers’ employment growth rates. Therefore, an industry with high employment growth
variance must also have a high average value of job reallocation. Any regression across indus-
9tries of employment growth’s variance against the average job reallocation rate would …nd a
positive association between the two variables, although the interpretation that idiosyncratic
risk increases aggregate variance would not be valid. When producers are heterogeneous within
industries, such spurious regression results need not arise, but the possibility certainly exists.
To mitigate this problem, we use the sum of an industry’s job creation and destruction rates’
median values in our sample to measure the idiosyncratic risk faced by that industry’s plants.
To further minimize the impact of aggregate volatility on our measure of idiosyncratic risk,
we use DHS’s annual job creation and destruction data instead of their quarterly series. This
eliminates seasonal ‡uctuations from our analysis. The data used to construct each industry’s
sample statistics cover the years 1973 through 1986, the year before an extensive rede…nition of
the four-digit industry codes.
Figure 2 illustrates this cross-industry comparison by plotting the job growth rate’s sample
standard deviation versus our measure of idiosyncratic risk for all 446 industries in our sample.
The data were …rst regressed against a full set of two-digit industry dummies, and the residuals
from this regression were used to construct Figure 2. The …gure’s solid line is the estimated linear
regression curve for this data. Its slope equals the estimated coe¢cient on our idiosyncratic risk
measure from the multivariate regression. Although there is considerable variation of the data
around the estimated regression line, the plot clearly indicates a positive relationship between
our measure of idiosyncratic risk and the job growth rate’s standard deviation. The estimated
regression coe¢cient equals 0:17 (with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 0:012.) To
help gauge this estimate’s economic signi…cance, Table 2 reports summary statistics for our
regressions’ independent and dependent variables. The cross-industry standard deviation for
our measure of idiosyncratic risk is 5:90%. Our estimated coe¢cient then implies that a one
standard deviation increase in our measure of idiosyncratic risk raises the standard deviation of
an industry’s job growth rate by approximately one percentage point.
Table 3 reports the coe¢cients on our measure of idiosyncratic risk from all four regressions.
The …rst column reports ordinary least squares estimates. Figure 1 clearly indicates the presence
of outliers in our data. The second column reports least absolute deviations estimates to verify
that our results do not depend on a few outlying observations. The typical four-digit indus-
10try accounts for only a small fraction of total manufacturing employment, and our estimation
procedure weights each industry equally, regardless of its size. The …nal column reports OLS
estimates after deleting the smallest one quarter of our sample’s industries, so we can verify that
small and unimportant industries are not essential for our results. Below each estimate is its
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error.
The estimated coe¢cients for all of the OLS regressions are positive and statistically signi…-
cant. The least absolute deviations estimates and the OLS estimates with the restricted sample
are also positive and statistically signi…cant. Furthermore, they di¤er little from the baseline
OLS estimates. Apparently, our measure of idiosyncratic risk is associated with higher aggre-
gate employment variance, regardless of the estimation method, sample, or measure of aggregate
volatility. The baseline estimates imply that raising our measure of idiosyncratic risk by one
standard deviation increases the standard deviations of job creation, destruction, and realloca-
tion by 0:77, 0:55, and 0:73 percentage points. One interesting feature of the OLS estimates
is that job creation’s standard deviation increases more with idiosyncratic risk than does job
destruction’s, suggesting that idiosyncratic risk reduces an industry’s variance ratio. Indeed,
when we repeat our analysis using the variance ratio’s square root as the dependent variable, we
…nd that idiosyncratic risk reduces the variance ratio. Recall that the variance ratio for young
plants is much smaller than that for old plants, so this e¤ect of idiosyncratic risk is consistent
across our two ways of grouping plants.
Whether we look across industries or across plants of di¤erent ages, we …nd that groups
of plants with high idiosyncratic risk also display high aggregate time-series variances. Before
considering our model of this relationship, it is worth noting one important caveat to our results.
Our measure of a four-digit industry’s risk is based on idiosyncratic employment volatility, and
we argued that young plants face more risk than their older counterparts because they also
display high idiosyncratic variances of employment growth. Because our risk measures are
indirect, they could re‡ect di¤erences across plants that have nothing to do with productivity
or demand risk, most notably di¤erences in plants’ adjustment costs. In the model of Campbell
and Fisher (2000), an industry with high adjustment costs will display less job reallocation and
respond less to aggregate shocks simply because doing so is expensive. Such an industry will
11also have a relatively high variance ratio, because adjustment costs create asymmetries in plants’
responses to transitory real wage shocks that generate a variance ratio above one. Therefore,
it is possible to explain our results as only re‡ecting plants’ di¤erent adjustment costs. This
explanation may have some appeal when considering our cross-industry evidence, because it is
natural to suppose that adjustment technologies vary across industries. However, it can explain
our results over the plant life-cycle only if plants’ adjustment costs exogenously increase as they
age. In the remainder of this paper, we provide a model in which plants’ adjustment costs
endogenously rise with age in response to exogenously decreasing idiosyncratic risk.
3. Microeconomic E¤ects of Idiosyncratic Risk
This section develops intuition about the impact of idiosyncratic risk on an employer’s responses
to aggregate shocks, by recasting the two-period investment and option pricing model of Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) as a job creation decision. We extend that framework by allowing the holder
of a job creation opportunity to …ll it temporarily, which requires no sunk cost.
Consider the problem of a producer with an opportunity to create a single job. At discrete
time intervals, the producer can choose between three options. It can irreversibly expend man-
agerial resources to create an organized job, it can create a temporary job, or it can leave the
opportunity unexploited. The cost of the managerial resources used to create an organized job
is ¿c, which we refer to as the job creation cost. After creating an organized job, the producer
incurs the wage cost W per period to …ll it with one worker. If it is created, the organized
job’s output of the numeraire good in the initial period is Z0. For simplicity, we assume that
the decision to create an organized job is irreversible and that the job cannot be abandoned to
avoid the wage cost. Creating a temporary job does not require paying a job creation cost, it is
perfectly reversible in future periods, and it does not foreclose the option to create an organized
job later. The cost of …lling a temporary job with one worker is also W per period, and its
output in the initial period is µZ0, where µ is strictly between zero and one.
After the initial period, the job’s productivity is subject to a shock. With probability 1=2,
it grows to (1 + ¾)Z0, and with equal probability it shrinks to (1 ¡ ¾)Z0. Thereafter, the job’s
12productivity remains unchanged. So that productivity is always positive, we proceed under the
assumption that ¾ is less than one. Denote the organized job’s productivity in the second and
all subsequent periods with Z1. The output of a temporary job is µZ1 following the productivity
shock.
Suppose that the producer is risk-neutral and discounts future pro…ts at the constant net
interest rate r. Furthermore, assume that






This upper bound on the job creation cost is su¢cient to guarantee that temporary jobs are never
used after the initial period.4 Given this restriction, the producer’s optimal employment policy
takes a simple form. If Z0 falls below
³
r
1+r £ ¿c + W
´
=(1 + ¾), then the producer will never
create an organized job, even following a favorable productivity shock. In this case, creating a
temporary job is also not pro…table under any circumstances, so the job creation opportunity
will go unexploited.5 If Z0 is greater than a second threshold, which we denote with Z?
0, the
producer should immediately create an organized job. If Z0 lies between these two thresholds,
the producer’s optimal policy is to delay creating an organized job until Z1 is known. The
organized job should be created in the second period if and only if the productivity shock is
favorable.
A producer waiting to learn Z1 should create a temporary job only if doing so is pro…table,
which will be the case if Z0 is greater than W=µ. This is only possible if Z?
0 is greater than W=µ.
Otherwise, all job creation opportunities that can be pro…table temporary jobs are immediately
created into organized jobs. Thus, the producer’s use of temporary jobs depends on its policy
for creating organized jobs.
We wish to demonstrate that increasing ¾, which increases the producer’s idiosyncratic risk,
increases Z?
0 and thereby increases the producer’s propensity to use temporary jobs. It is well
4To see this, note that creating an organized job following a favorable productivity shock is more pro…table
than perpetually maintaining a temporary job if and only if Z0 (1 + ¾) ¡ r
1+r¿c > µZ0 (1 + ¾). The analysis of
the case following an unfavorable shock is identical and straightforward.
5To see that creating a temporary job is not optimal in this case, assume that the contrary is true and use
the inequality in (1) to show that Z0 must be greater than
³
r
¹ 1+r £ ¿c + W
´
=(1 + ¾).
13known that standard methods for the pricing and optimal exercise of …nancial call options can
be used to characterize Z?
0, and we follow this approach here. To do so, let V0(Z0) denote the
fundamental value of organized job creation, the expected present discounted value of pro…ts
from immediately creating an organized job, gross of the job creation cost, and let F0(Z0) denote
the value of an unexercised option to create an organized job in the following period. In this
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otherwise.
Immediate creation of an organized job involves three costs, the direct cost of job creation,
¿c, the value of the option to create the job tomorrow, F0(Z0), and the pro…ts from operating
the job opportunity as a temporary job. Immediate job creation is only optimal if the value of
the job created is greater than its total cost. The value of Z0 which equates the bene…t and cost
of immediately creating an organized job is the desired threshold. That is
V0(Z
?




0 ¡ W;0g: (2)
Figure 3’s upper panel illustrates the determination of Z?
0 by plotting the left and right hand
sides of Equation (2) as functions of Z0, which we refer to as the fundamental value curve and
the total cost curve. The total cost curve is kinked at Z0 = W=µ. If the kink occurs to the
right of Z?
0, then the …rm will never create a temporary job. Otherwise, job opportunities with
productivity between W=µ and Z?
0 will be …lled with temporary jobs in the initial period. In
this panel of the …gure, Z?
0 is less than W=µ, so the producer will not use a temporary job.
Figure 3’s lower panel repeats the analysis of the upper panel using a higher value of ¾ to
show how idiosyncratic risk a¤ects the use of temporary jobs. As is familiar from the study
of irreversible investment, increasing idiosyncratic risk increases the value of the unexercised
job creation option, rotating the total cost curve upward and increasing Z?
0. In the …gure, this
14increase pushes Z?
0 past W=µ, making the creation of a temporary job optimal for some values
of Z0. With the higher value of ¾, creating a temporary job is optimal if Z0 lies between W=µ
and Z?
0. With the lower value of ¾ in Figure 3’s upper panel, all jobs created are organized. In
this sense, increasing idiosyncratic risk increases producers’ use of temporary jobs.
To examine how idiosyncratic productivity risk in‡uences aggregate employment dynamics
in this setting, consider a group of plants, within an industry, say, or alternatively, of a certain
age classi…cation. These plants consist of job creation opportunities with di¤erent values of Z0.
The industry’s employment growth in the initial period will equal the number of jobs created,
which will depend on both the distribution of productivity across job creation opportunities
and the optimal employment policy. If a job creation opportunity’s productivity is greater than
either Z?
0 or W=µ, it will be …lled by some worker. We refer to the minimum of these two
productivity thresholds as the e¤ective job creation threshold. The number of jobs created in
the initial period will equal the number of job creation opportunities with Z0 greater than the
e¤ective job creation threshold.
Consider the industry’s employment response to a very simple aggregate productivity shock
which simply shifts the distribution of Z0 to the right. This productivity shock leaves producers
employment policies unchanged and a¤ects aggregate employment only by increasing the total
number of job creation opportunities with productivity above the e¤ective job creation threshold.
In this case, whether or not the industry’s marginal job is temporary or organized is irrelevant for
the industry’s employment in the initial period. The only industry characteristic that matters
for the response of employment to this shock is the number of job creation opportunities with
Z0 near the e¤ective job creation threshold. This illustrates that producers’ use of temporary
jobs need not matter for aggregate dynamics.6
Our conclusions regarding temporary jobs and aggregate employment are less ambiguous
when we instead consider an aggregate shock that necessarily changes producers’ employment
policies. Suppose now that an aggregate shock changes the wage in the initial period to W0, but
the wages in all subsequent periods are una¤ected. Both W0 and W are known to the producer
6In this setting, producers’ use of temporary jobs will matter for job destruction in the next period, because
all temporary jobs that do not receive favorable productivity shocks are not replaced with permanent jobs.
However, this is a consequence of the assumption that producers’ productivity risk lasts only one period.
15when it makes its initial job creation decision. If no producer uses temporary jobs in the initial










< 1 + r:
The upper bound on dZ?
0=dW0 follows from the assumption that ¾ is less than one. When some
producers use temporary jobs, the e¤ective job creation threshold’s derivative with respect to
W0 equals 1=µ, which is greater than 1 + r if µ is su¢ciently below one. The intuition for
this di¤erence is that a temporary wage change has a relatively small e¤ect on the total cost
of organized job creation when compared to its bene…t. Therefore, any use of temporary jobs
induced by high idiosyncratic risk will increase the response of the e¤ective job creation threshold
to the transitory wage shock. In this sense, idiosyncratic risk makes individual producers’
employment policies more ‡exible.
Whether or not the ‡exibility of producers’ policies has a signi…cant impact on the industry’s
employment growth ultimately depends on the distribution of Z0. If increasing ¾ moves the
e¤ective job threshold from a point in the distribution of Z0 with many job creation opportunities
to one with very few, then a high-risk industry’s employment will respond very little to a wage
change. On the other hand, the e¤ective job creation threshold’s location matters little for
aggregate dynamics if the distribution of Z0 is relatively ‡at. In this case, greater ‡exibility of
producer’s job creation policies will directly produce a larger response in aggregate employment
to a given wage shock. In the current example, the distribution of Z0 must be exogenously
speci…ed and unrelated to producers’ productivity risk, so it is impossible to determine the
importance of these distributional considerations for aggregate dynamics. For this reason, we
proceed to consider a richer model in which the idiosyncratic risk an industry’s producers face
determines its productivity distribution. Nevertheless, this simple framework suggests that the
e¤ects of idiosyncratic risk on the ‡exibility of producers’ employment policies may explain the
empirical evidence relating idiosyncratic risk and aggregate employment dynamics.
164. The Model
The remainder of this paper quantitatively evaluates the impact of idiosyncratic risk and tem-
porary jobs on aggregate employment dynamics. For this purpose we generalize the decision
problem studied in the previous section and place the producer within the context of an industry.
We consider an industry of plants that produce a single good for sale in a competitive product
market. Plants use a single factor of production, labor, that they hire in a competitive labor
market. Labor comes in …xed shift lengths. We refer to an employee working one shift as a
job. As in the previous section, a worker can be used in one of two kinds of jobs, organized and
temporary, which di¤er in productivity and adjustment costs.
Let nt and lt denote the number of organized and temporary jobs …lled by a particular plant
in period t. The plant’s output in that period is z
1¡®
t (nt + µlt)
®, where both ® and µ are between
zero and one. We refer to zt as the plant’s productivity, but it can also be interpreted as its
stock of an endowed and untradable input, such as managerial skill. Productivity evolves as
lnzt+1 = lnzt + "t+1:
We assume that "t+1 has a Gaussian distribution that is truncated above and below by very large
(in absolute value) numbers, a technical condition used in the analysis of the plant’s dynamic
programming problem.
The per period cost of a job measured in units of the constant output price, which we call the
wage, is denoted by Wt, so the plant’s total wage bill in period t is Wt(nt + lt). The wage follows
a two-state Markov chain between low and high values, W l and W h, with transition matrix ¦.
As described in Campbell and Fisher (2000), variations in the wage can be interpreted within a
general equilibrium framework as arising from shocks to the supply of labor to the industry and
shocks to the demand for the industry’s product. In the baseline version of our model, changes in
Wt are the only source of aggregate ‡uctuations and "t is purely idiosyncratic. However, we also
consider speci…cations of our model in which plants’ productivity is the product of idiosyncratic
and aggregate components, where the latter component is the source of aggregate ‡uctuations.
The plant incurs employment adjustment costs, but only for changes in nt. When the plant
17increases nt, it incurs the job creation cost of ¿c units of lost output for every organized job
added. If the plant reduces nt, it incurs the job destruction cost of ¿d units of lost output for
every organized job destroyed. So the adjustment costs incurred by the plant when it changes
employment from nt¡1 to nt are
¿ (nt¡1;nt) = (¿cI fnt > nt¡1g ¡ ¿dI fnt < nt¡1g)(nt ¡ nt¡1); (3)
where I f¢g is the indicator function. The job creation and destruction costs are unrelated to
the identity of the worker …lling the job, so they can be interpreted as net adjustment costs, as
de…ned by Hammermesh and Pfann (1996). In a model similar to ours but without aggregate
‡uctuations, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999) interpret ¿c as the cost of hiring a “per-
manent” worker, and ¿d is the cost of dismissing that worker. In this case it is costly to replace
one worker with another, so there is surplus value to be split between a worker and her employer,
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Our analysis goes through under this interpretation if
we assume that Wt is the return a worker gets to operating a home production technology, and
that the employer has all bargaining power when negotiating wages.
To examine how groups of plants facing di¤erent degrees of idiosyncratic risk respond to the
same aggregate shock, we incorporate a plant life-cycle into the model. An exogenous ‡ow of
new plants begins production every period. So that the mass of plants operating is constant
over time, all incumbents face an exogenous probability of exit as well. Because we assume
exit is exogenous, we are unable to characterize the e¤ect of idiosyncratic productivity risk on
producers’ exit decisions. However, this assumption preserves the technical simplicity of the
plant’s optimization problem. At any given plant, the process governing exit and the evolution
of productivity depends on an exogenous state variable, st, which can equal either sn, for “new,”
or sm, for “mature.” Plants begin life with st = sn and after every period there is a constant
probability, Á; of transiting to st = sm, which is an absorbing state. A plant’s probability of exit
after period t is ±(st). The mean and variance of the plant’s productivity innovation, ¹(st) and
¾2(st), may also depend on the state variable. Note that plants for which st = sn will tend to
be younger than average. Hence, while not important from a technical standpoint, it is natural
18to assume that ¾(sn) > ¾(sm) and ±(sn) > ± (sm); so that young plants are subject to more
productivity and exit risk than their older counterparts.
Finally, we assume that risk-neutral managers who discount future pro…ts with the constant
discount factor ¯ 2 (0;1) choose employment to maximize the expected present discounted value
of the plants’ pro…ts. We now describe the decision problems of mature and new plants.
4.1. Mature Plants
The manager of a mature plant faces the problem of choosing the number of organized and
temporary jobs to …ll every period in order to maximize the present discounted value of pro…ts.
Conditional on a plant’s choice of organized jobs, its use of temporary jobs solves a static pro…t
maximization problem. Denote this problem’s attained value with f (z;n;W),
f (z;n;W) = max
l¸0 z
1¡® (n + µl)
® ¡ W (n + l): (4)
The solution to this problem is straightforward. If n=z is greater than (W=(®µ))
1=(1¡®), then the
marginal product of the …rst temporary job is below the wage and the plant uses no temporary
jobs. Otherwise, the plant’s choice of l satis…es
µ®z
1¡® (n + µl)
®¡1 = W:
To characterize the choice of organized jobs, we cast the relevant pro…t maximization problem
as a dynamic program. There are three state variables, the plant’s productivity, the number of
organized jobs it used in the previous period, and the wage. Using m to denote the number of
organized jobs in the previous period and dropping time subscripts, the dynamic program is
g(z;m;W) = max




Here, Em [¢j¢] is the conditional expectations operator associated with the transition matrix for
W and the evolution of z for mature plants, and we use the ‘0’ notation in the usual fashion. It
is straightforward to show, as in Campbell and Fisher (2000), that g(z;m;W) can be written
19as g(z;m;W) = z£v(m=z;W); where v(m=z;W) = g(1;m=z;W): De…ne the scaled numbers
of organized jobs, x = m=z and y = n=z: Substituting the scaled version of the value function
into the Bellman equation and utilizing the fact that lnz follows a random walk, we can de…ne
a Bellman equation for the scaled value function, v(x;W),
v(x;W) = max
y¸0 [¼ (x;y;W) + ¯ (1 ¡ ± (s
m))Em [uv(y=u;W
0)jW]];








y + e y(W)¡y
µ
´
¡ ¿ (x;y) if y < e y (W)
y® ¡ Wy ¡ ¿ (x;y) if y ¸ e y(W):
and





This …nal quantity, e y (W), equals the scaled value of optimal employment at a plant that faces
no adjustment costs and a wage equal to W=µ. For this reason, we refer to it as the plant’s
frictionless labor demand schedule.
In general, the optimal choice of y can involve either increasing the number of organized
jobs, decreasing it, or leaving it unchanged. If the plant increases the number of organized jobs,






¡ ¿c + ¯ (1 ¡ ± (s
m))Em [v
0 (y=u;W
0)jW] = 0; if y < e y (W) (5)
®y
®¡1 ¡ W ¡ ¿c + ¯ (1 ¡ ± (s
m))Em [v
0 (y=u;W
0)jW] = 0, if y ¸ e y (W);
where v0 (x;W) is the derivative of v(x;W) with respect to its …rst argument, which exists
almost everywhere due to that function’s concavity. If the plant decreases its stock of organized
jobs, the …rst-order condition for y is
®y
®¡1 ¡ W + ¿d + ¯ (1 ¡ ±(s
m))Em [v
0 (y=u;W
0)jW] = 0: (6)
20To characterize the optimal policy, let ym (W) and ym (W) be the unique values of y that
satisfy (5) and (6) with equality. The optimal policy is to set y = ym (W) if x · ym (W), to
set y = ¹ ym (W) if x ¸ ¹ ym (W), and to set y = x if ym (W) < x < ¹ ym (W). To describe the
decision rule for n, de…ne the job creation and destruction schedules nm (z;W) = z £ ym (W)
and ¹ nm (z;W) = z £ ¹ ym (W); respectively. Then, the optimal policy is to set n equal to the
job creation schedule if m falls below it and to set n equal to the job destruction schedule if m
falls above it. If m falls between these two schedules, the optimal policy is to leave the stock of
organized jobs unchanged. If the optimal choice of n is less than z £ e y (W), then the optimal
number of temporary jobs is
l =
(z £ e y (W) ¡ n)
µ
:
Otherwise, the optimal number of temporary jobs equals zero.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal employment policy for a mature plant for a given value of
W. Here, we have assumed e y (W) < ym (W), so that no mature plant uses temporary jobs at
this wage. The job creation and destruction schedules are both log linear in z with intercepts
lnym (W) and ln ¹ ym (W) and a common slope of one. The …gure illustrates the employment
decisions of three plants, labeled A, B, and C, with the same value of lagged employment but
di¤erent current productivity realizations. Plant A lies above the job destruction schedule, so
it reduces employment. Plant B lies between the two schedules in the region of inaction, so
it leaves employment unchanged. Plant C lies below the job creation schedule, so it increases
employment. The logarithmic employment growth rates of plants A and C equal the vertical
distances from their initial locations to the job creation and destruction schedules.
4.2. New Plants
The problem faced by a new plant is similar to that of mature plants. The only di¤erences are
that the probability of exit and the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity innovations
correspond to those for new plants, and there is a constant probability of transiting from the new
to the mature state. Just as with mature plants, job creation and destruction schedules charac-
terize the optimal choices of organized jobs for new plants. The Bellman equation characterizing
21a new plant’s value function, r (z;m;W); is
r (z;m;W) = max
n¸0 ff (z;n;W) ¡ ¿ (m;n)
+¯ (1 ¡ ± (s
n))(En [Ág(z
0;n;W
0) + (1 ¡ Á)r(z
0;n;W
0)jz;W])g:
The expectations operator En [¢j¢] is that associated with the transition matrix for W and the
evolution of z for new plants. Just as with the mature plant’s problem, the unique solution
to the new plant’s problem can be written as r(z;m;W) = z £ r(1;m=z;W); so that there
exists a scaled version of the Bellman equation with a unique, concave, solution. The optimal
employment policies for new plants therefore have the same form as those for old plants, but
they may take on di¤erent values. That is, there are job creation and destruction schedules,
nn (z;W) = z £ yn (W) and ¹ nn (z;W) = z £ ¹ yn (W). The optimal policy is to leave the plant’s
stock of organized jobs unchanged if the plant falls between the two schedules. Otherwise, the
plant should adjust employment in organized jobs to the closest schedule. Optimal employment
in temporary jobs can then be determined exactly as it is for mature plants.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal employment policy for new plants, assuming e y (W) > yn (W),
so that a new plant might use temporary jobs at this wage. The …gure plots job creation and
destruction schedules as well as the frictionless labor demand schedule a plant would use if it
faced no adjustment cost and a wage equal to W=µ. Adding the possibility of using temporary
jobs complicates plants’ employment dynamics, but it also enlarges the scope of observable
behavior that the model can generate. To be concrete, consider the employment decisions of
six plants, labeled A through F in the …gure. All of these plants have the same lagged value of
employment in organized jobs, nt¡1, but di¤erent realizations of current productivity. Suppose
that the wage does not change between the previous and current period, so that these plants’
employment changes re‡ect only idiosyncratic shocks.
As in Figure 1, plant A lies above the job destruction schedule. Its optimal employment
policy is to lower n down to that schedule and to set its employment of temporary jobs equal to
zero. Therefore, we know that this plant destroys jobs. Unlike in the case without temporary
jobs, the extent to which plant A destroys jobs depends not only on the vertical distance from
22A to the job destruction schedule but also on that plant’s use of temporary jobs in the previous
period. Plants B and C both lie between the job creation and destruction schedules, so they will
leave their stock of organized jobs unchanged. Because these plants also lie above the frictionless
labor demand schedule, they will not use temporary jobs this period. Even though their stock of
organized jobs will be unchanged, we may observe them destroying jobs if they used temporary
jobs in the previous period. For example, B will destroy temporary jobs if it was at a point
like D in the previous period, but it will not if it was at a point like C. Plants D and E are
also between the job creation and destruction schedules, but they both lie below the frictionless
labor demand schedule. Therefore, these plants may either create or destroy temporary jobs.
For example, D will create jobs if it ended the previous period at C, and it will destroy jobs if
it transited from E. Finally, plant F lies below the job creation schedule. It will increase its
stock of organized jobs and its employment of temporary jobs.7
The preceding discussion illustrates that not all plants increasing or decreasing employment
lie on the job creation and destruction schedules. Those plants that fall in the region of inaction
between the two schedules may change their use of temporary jobs. However, the model displays
an empirically relevant feature of the simpler models without temporary jobs, namely that a
positive fraction of plants leave their employment unchanged between periods. The variety of
plants’ responses to a change in Wt is correspondingly wide. If Wt rises from W l to W h, we
expect those plants on the job destruction schedule to adjust their stock of organized jobs further
downward. Plants in the region of inaction above the frictionless labor demand schedule will
not respond at all to the shock, while those below it will respond to the shock only by changing
their use of temporary jobs. Finally, those plants on the job creation schedule will change both
their organized and temporary jobs in response to the wage increase.
7When Wt changes between periods, a number of new possibilities arise. For example, a plant like F could
be observed to reduce employment if the frictionless labor demand schedule falls so much that the plant reduces
its use of temporary jobs in spite of its favorable idiosyncratic productivity shock.
235. Aggregate Implications of Idiosyncratic Risk
This section uses the industry model to assess the quantitative impact of idiosyncratic risk on
aggregate employment dynamics. These dynamics are derived by aggregating the individual
decisions of the population of plants in the model.8 We are interested in two key issues left
unresolved by studying the example in Section 3. First, do plants’ employment decisions behave
as suggested by the example? Second, how do these microeconomic policies a¤ect aggregate
variables when the distribution of plants in the state space is endogenous? Since the industry
model is more general than the example, we are also interested in documenting other e¤ects of
idiosyncratic risk not suggested by the example.
To guide our analysis we compare the employment dynamics emerging from various param-
eterizations of the model to data on job ‡ows in the U.S. manufacturing sector compiled by
DHS. We …nd that the microeconomic policies in the industry model behave as predicted by the
example and that because of this the model shares many of its features of gross job ‡ows with
the data. Idiosyncratic risk’s impact on the use of temporary jobs is quantitatively the most
important mechanism in the model.
The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we discuss how parameter values were selected.
Second, we document numerically the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty on a plant’s optimal
employment policy. The model’s implications for aggregate dynamics depend on plant-level
decisions, but they also depend on how the distribution of employment and productivity across
plants evolves. As is familiar from Caballero (1992), endogenous changes in the plants’ distribu-
tion can make the evolution of an aggregate variable quite unlike that of its counterpart at any
particular plant. The third step, then, is to verify that these considerations do not completely
o¤set the e¤ects of the microeconomic policies. To do so, we display the dynamics of employ-
ment growth of the populations of young and old plants for several special cases of our model.
Finally, we compare the statistics on gross job ‡ows resulting from simulations of the model to
8The solution to the decision problems of individual plants is quite straightfoward and can be computed almost
exactly. See Campbell and Fisher (1999) for the method. Computing the aggregate dynamics in this model is
less straightforward. For a description of the relevant transition equations for the distribution of employment
across plants and the expressions for gross job ‡ows derived from the time series of this distribution, see the
technical appendix of this paper, available on the World Wide Web at http://home.uchicago.edu/~jcampbe.
24the evidence from the U.S. manufacturing sector.
5.1. Parameter Values
To simulate our model we need to specify the following parameters:
Plant-level parameters: ®;¯;¹n;¾n;¹m;¾m;±n;±m;¿c;¿d;µ;Á
Aggregate Uncertainty: ¦;W h;W l:
We proceed by …nding parameters so that the model comes close to mimicking the gross job
‡ows in a “representative” manufacturing industry when temporary jobs are used sometimes.
To quantify the various mechanisms operating in the model, we study perturbations of the
model around this baseline calibration. We use the gross job ‡ow data by plant age for the
manufacturing sector as a whole to choose parameters. Data by plant age are not available by
industry.
The elasticity of production with respect to labor input, ®, is approximately equal to the
share of output paid to labor.9 We set ® to 0:66: The discount factor, ¯; is set to 1:05¡1=4 so
that the annual risk free real interest rate is 5%, and a period in the model corresponds to one
quarter of a year.
Holding …xed all other model parameters, the job reallocation rate for young plants (consis-
tent with the DHS data we study below, age 40 quarters or less) and old plants (all other plants)
in the model is increasing in the amount of idiosyncratic uncertainty. Therefore we choose the
two standard deviations, ¾n and ¾m; by matching the steady state of the model to the average
job reallocation rates (the sum of the rates of job creation and destruction) for young and old
plants in the U.S. manufacturing sector, 14:1% and 9:8%, respectively.10 The expected value of
productivity growth for a plant of type x = n;m is given by exp(¹x+¾2
x=2): We use this formula
to …x ¹n and ¹m so that productivity growth is zero on average for both new and mature plants.
9This will not be exact because of the adjustment costs.
10Rates of job creation and destruction in the model are the population counterparts of the measures de…ned
as in DHS. For a particular set of plants, e.g. young plants, the rate of job creation at date t is the sum of all
jobs created between dates t and date t ¡ 1 divided by the average of total employment for the group of plants
in dates t and t ¡ 1: The rate of job destruction is de…ned similarly.
25This ensures that total industry employment does not have a trend.
Increases in the exogenous exit rates, ±n and ±m; increase the fraction of employment at
plants which exit (NEGD in the notation of DHS). Therefore, we choose these parameters so
that the fraction of employment at young and old plants which exit in the steady state of the
model corresponds to averages for these variables in the U.S. manufacturing sector. The target
averages are 1:23% for young plants and 0:47% for old plants.
We follow Campbell and Fisher (2000) in selecting baseline values for values ¿c and ¿d; the
costs of creating and destroying organized jobs. These net adjustment costs involve disruptions
to production and all other costs that are not related to the identity of a worker but depend
solely on changing the number of employees. We choose the process for the wage so that on
average it equals unity in the model. Consequently, values for the adjustment cost parameters
can be interpreted as fractions of a quarterly wage. Campbell and Fisher (2000) survey the
available evidence and determine that ¿c = 1:5 and ¿d = 0:5 is a reasonable benchmark. Note
that this is consistent with the generally held view that the most relevant case for the U.S. labor
market is that creation costs exceed destruction costs. However, our qualitative conclusions also
hold if the cost of job destruction is larger than that for job creation.
The …nal two plant-level parameters are Á; the probability of a new plant transiting to mature
status, and µ; the relative productivity of temporary jobs. We …x Á so that the average time
before transiting to mature status following birth is 5 years. This corresponds to Á = 0:05: We
assume µ = 0:7: With this choice temporary jobs are used by new plants only.

















and the two wage states are W h = exp(¾W) and Wl = exp(¡¾W). Here ½ and ¾W are the
…rst order autocorrelation coe¢cient and the standard deviation of ln(Wt); respectively. In our
baseline calibration we …x ½ = 0 so that the wage is i.i.d. and select ¾W to match the standard
deviation of employment growth for the manufacturing sector, 1:90%. We do consider other
values for ½.
26The parameters underlying our baseline calibration are summarized in Table 1. Notice that
the standard deviation of productivity and the exit rate at new plants are greater than at mature
plants. Since plants begin life as new-type plants and only later become mature-type plants, this
corresponds to younger plants in the model being faced with greater idiosyncratic risk than old
plants, consistent with the evidence reported by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989).11 Hence
our baseline calibration corresponds to the conventional understanding of how idiosyncratic risk
varies by plant (or …rm) age.
The implied employment policy is shown in the …rst row of Table 5. This table lists the
intercepts of the creation and destruction schedules of new and mature plants as well as the
intercepts of the frictionless employment schedule. As this table shows, e y(Wl) = 0:117 >
0:098 = yn(W l), which means temporary jobs are used by new plants in the low wage state.
However, yn(W h) is greater than e y(Wh), so new plants do not use temporary jobs in the high
wage state. Mature plants never use temporary jobs. Since idiosyncratic risk is greater for new
plants than mature plants in the calibrated model, this is consistent with the example.
5.2. E¤ects of Idiosyncratic Risk on Optimal Employment Policies
In this section we consider the impact of idiosyncratic risk on the optimal employment policies
of mature plants. We …x all other parameters at their calibrated values except those noted
below. Consider …rst the impact of idiosyncratic risk on the decision to use temporary jobs.
Unlike the example in Section 3, the industry model has exit risk in addition to productivity
risk, and this too may in‡uence the use of temporary jobs because it a¤ects the rate at which
future adjustment costs are discounted. Figure 6 shows the e¤ects of increasing productivity
(top graph) and exit risk (bottom graph) on the log level of the intercepts of the organized
creation schedule in the steady state. To help evaluate the e¤ects, note that the calibrated
values of productivity risk and exit risk at new plants are near the midpoints of the horizontal
axes. The solid line in each plot corresponds to the calibrated values for the adjustment costs,
the short dashed lines correspond to a case in which ¿d is raised to 2:0 and ¿c is lowered to
11Note that the magnitudes of ¾n and ¾m overstate the degree of productivity risk faced by plants since
productivity is raised to the power 1 ¡ ® in the production function.
27zero, and the long dashed lines correspond to a case where ¿c equals 2:0 and ¿d equals zero.
The horizontal lines indicate the threshold determining whether temporary jobs are ever used.
When the intercept of the log creation schedule lies below this threshold, temporary jobs are
used. The extent to which a plant relies on temporary jobs is directly related to the vertical
distance between the threshold and the intercept.
Consistent with the example developed in Section 3, the top graph of Figure 6 shows that
increasing productivity risk does indeed increase the use of temporary jobs in the industry model.
Moreover, according to the graph, this fact does not depend on the con…guration of adjustment
costs. Another result is that the intensity of temporary job use is higher when adjustment costs
fall more heavily on the creation margin. When adjustment costs are con…gured in this way the
total cost of creating a job rises because future job destruction costs, another cost of creating
a job, are discounted and job creation costs are not. Hence there is greater substitution away
from organized jobs and toward temporary jobs.
The bottom graph of Figure 6 shows that increasing exit risk, ±m; can increase the use of
temporary jobs as well, but that this depends on the con…guration of adjustment costs. If the
adjustment costs fall more heavily on the destruction margin, then the exit rate does not have
this e¤ect; otherwise, it does. Increasing the exit rate increases the rate at which future costs of
adding an organized job are discounted. Since the future destruction costs associated with an
organized job are a cost of adding such a job, increasing exit risk reduces the total cost of the
marginal job. With diminishing returns, this implies that more organized jobs must be added.
Increasing exit risk lowers the value of future creation costs avoided by creating an organized
job immediately, and so when adjustment costs fall more heavily on this margin the total cost
of organized job creation rises.
5.3. E¤ects of Idiosyncratic Risk on Employment Growth Aggregates
Here we study the dynamics of employment growth of young and old plants implied by the
optimal employment policies of new and mature plants for two polar cases for the wage transition
matrix. The …rst case we consider involves specifying ½ = ¡1 so that the o¤-diagonal elements
of ¦ equal unity. This implies that the wage follows a two-period cycle. We consider two
28parameterizations. In one, the remaining parameters are …xed at their calibrated values, in
particular µ = 0:7: With a two period cycle this implies new plants use temporary jobs in
both wage states, but mature plants never use temporary jobs. The other parameterization is
identical except µ = 0 so that only organized jobs are used by both new and mature plants.
Demeaned simulated employment growth for young plants (solid lines/circles) and old plants
(dash lines/squares) implied by the two parameterizations are illustrated in Figure 7, where the
top plot corresponds to the model in which temporary jobs are used by new plants and the
bottom plot corresponds to the parameterization with only organized jobs. The top plot shows
that when temporary jobs are used by new plants only, they can have a substantial impact on
employment growth, making young plants much more variable than old plants. The bottom plot
shows that di¤erences in the employment policies of young and old plants translate only slightly
into di¤erences in their aggregate dynamics when temporary jobs are not used. Nevertheless,
young plants are more variable than old plants, as is the case in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Consistent with the example, overall volatility is clearly lower than in the case without temporary
jobs.
The polar opposite of the two-period cycle for the wage is to suppose that when computing
their optimal employment policy, plant managers expect the current wage to prevail forever. This
is captured by assuming ½ = 1 in (7). With µ = 0:7 and ½ = 1 temporary jobs are only used
by new plants in the low wage state. Figure 8 plots the dynamics following a wage change from
W h to Wl for the two parameterizations, µ = 0:7 and µ = 0. The change in the wage occurs
after …rst simulating the model for several periods at the initial wage until employment and
the distribution of employment across plants converge. Employment growth rates are plotted
relative to their values before the change. Generally, the …ndings are similar to the two-period
cycle cases. With temporary jobs used by new plants, young plants clearly respond more to the
wage change than old plants. Without temporary jobs, the di¤erence is less pronounced. Note
that in both parameterizations there is some persistence in the response of employment growth.
The key here is the region of inaction in the state space of the employment policy induced by
proportional adjustment costs. This feature of the model provides for an endogenous source of
persistence since individual plants are slow to respond to wage changes.
295.4. Quantifying the E¤ects of Idiosyncratic Risk
We now study the statistical properties of the calibrated model and its perturbations. The
perturbations are designed to shed light on the quantitative impact of (i) the use of temporary
jobs, (ii) increased idiosyncratic risk at new plants, (iii) higher adjustment costs, (iv) persistence
in the wage process and (v) aggregate technology shocks that leave plants’ scaled employment
policies unchanged. These perturbations and their implications for the employment policies
are summarized in the remaining rows of Table 5. In Tables 6 and 7 we display statistics
on gross job ‡ows for the U.S. manufacturing sector reproduced from Table 1 and statistics
based on the various versions of the model. Table 6 presents steady state statistics and Table 7
presents cyclical features of the data based on simulating the model.12 In the tables, ‘G’ denotes
employment growth, ‘C’ denotes the rate of job creation, ‘D’ denotes the rate of job destruction
and ‘R’ denotes the rate of job reallocation (recall that by de…nition R = C + D:)
5.4.1. The Calibrated Model
As already mentioned, the policy intercepts in Table 5 indicate that in the calibrated model
new plants choose to use temporary jobs only in the low wage state, and mature plants never
use them. Table 5 also shows that the intercept for the organized job creation schedule of new
plants is essentially the same across wage states, unlike with mature plants whose organized
creation intercept is clearly higher in the low wage state.
The implications of these employment policies for gross job ‡ows are summarized in Panel B
of Tables 6 and 7. Consider …rst the steady state values (which are close but not identical to the
means calculated from simulating the model with aggregate uncertainty). The parameters were
chosen to match the empirical reallocation rates for young and old plants, yet the model does
reasonably well at accounting for the total reallocation rate. This is a result of the fact that
the share of employment at young plants, 17%; is not far o¤ the value of this share in the data,
22:5%. Abstracting from the assumed absence of an employment trend in the model, the model
does quite well at accounting for the remaining qualitative features of the data. For example,
12All statistics for the model are based on simulating the model for 1050 periods, starting at the steady state
distribution of employment across plants and then discarding the …rst 50 observations.
30average growth at young plants is above zero and at old plants is less than zero. This di¤erence
results from the fact that mature plants are larger than new plants and that a large fraction of
employment growth at young plants is accounted for by the switch from new to mature status.
At old plants exit contributes to the net job loss on average.
Now consider the cyclical features of the data summarized in Panel B of Table 7. This shows
that idiosyncratic risk impacts aggregate employment growth in the manner anticipated by the
example in Section 3. The model was calibrated to the aggregate growth rate’s variance, but not
the variances of the age-speci…c growth rates. In the data the standard deviation of employment
growth, ¾G; at young plants is 2:32%; and in the model (where these plants rely on temporary
jobs) it is 3:69%. In the model old plants rely exclusively on the less ‡exible organized jobs
and so ¾G for these plants is much lower, 1:55%; compared to 1:81% in the data. If anything,
then, the calibrated model goes too far in reproducing the observed di¤erences in the aggregate
growth rates.
The calibrated model also does well at capturing the di¤erences in the volatility of creation,
destruction and reallocation at young and old plants. In the data these variables ‡uctuate more
at young plants than at old, and this is the case in the model as well. Moreover, the model
reproduces the qualitative result that the destruction-creation variance ratio is much lower for
young plants than for old plants. Due to the way job reallocation and job growth are de…ned
in terms of job creation and destruction (one is the sum and the other is the di¤erence of these
variables), qualitative success in terms of the variance ratio translates into a qualitative success
with respect to the correlation between job reallocation and job growth: job reallocation is
strongly countercyclical at old plants and less so at young plants.
To understand this success, …rst note that, as in Campbell and Fisher (2000), proportional
adjustment costs induce plants to move the organized job destruction schedule more than the
organized job creation schedule following a wage change. This asymmetric policy response
creates asymmetries in gross job ‡ows. Because young plants use temporary jobs as well as
organized jobs, the asymmetric ‡uctuations of the policies for creating and destroying organized
jobs have a smaller impact on their variance ratios. The evolution of the distribution of plants
across the state space also plays a crucial role. Since young plants begin life creating jobs, a
31relatively large fraction of the employment of young plants is bunched near the organized job
creation margin. This ampli…es the variation in job creation and contributes further to the low
variance asymmetry of young plants.
There are two main drawbacks of this calibration. Ultimately, these stem from the simplicity
of the model. First, the reallocation rates for young and old plants, and hence the whole
population of plants, are much less volatile in the model than in the data. The reason for this is
that, with only one source of aggregate variation in the model, job creation and destruction are
essentially perfectly negatively correlated. Since job reallocation is just the sum of job creation
and destruction, this dampens variation in job reallocation. The second drawback of the model
is that it lacks persistence. We consider this below.
5.4.2. Assessing the Role of Temporary Jobs
To assess the role of temporary jobs in generating the asymmetries in gross job ‡ows across
young and old plants, consider the results for the µ = 0 and µ = 0:75 perturbations of the
model. Obviously, when temporary jobs are not productive, no temporary jobs are used at
all. In this case we expect gross job ‡ows to be less variable for all plants, and especially young
plants, compared to the calibrated model. When the productivity of temporary jobs is increased
above its calibrated value, Table 5 shows that new plants use temporary jobs in both wage states
and mature plants use them in the low wage state. Therefore, we expect gross job ‡ows to be
more variable than in the calibrated model. Finally, note from Table 5 that with µ = 0:75 the
intercept of the organized creation margin for new plants increases with the wage so that the
use of organized jobs is countercyclical at these plants.
Panels C and D of Tables 6 and 7 show the aggregate implications of these employment
policies. Notice that with organized jobs only, µ = 0; the model generates an asymmetry in
the growth rates of young and old plants, but it is much smaller than in the calibrated model
with temporary jobs. This is consistent with the simulation results from the model with a two-
period cycle plotted Figure 7. The asymmetry is an implication of the fact that the creation
and destruction margins respond more in percentage terms at new plants than at mature plants.
From Table 5 we see that the creation margin changes by 7% more for new plants than for mature
32plants when the wage changes, and the destruction margin changes by 16% more. The fact that
the aggregate growth rates do not fully re‡ect these di¤erences is due to the fact that when
the wage changes not all plants change employment — some are in the region of inaction. On
the other hand, the fact that higher variance induces plants to respond more frequently implies
that among new plants a greater fraction of plants are at or near their adjustment thresholds
compared to mature plants. This ampli…es the e¤ects of the policy di¤erences.
The fact that increasing productivity risk makes plants which use only organized jobs more
responsive to a wage shock can be understood as follows. Note …rst that when a plant is
expected to spend a long time in the region of inaction, a change in the current wage has a small
percentage e¤ect on the total expected wage bill for the last organized job created or retained.
Increasing productivity risk tends to increase the frequency of job changes and reduce the time
spent in the region of action. This implies that the e¤ect of a wage change on the total expected
wage bill for the last organized job created or retained is larger, and we expect there to be
a correspondingly larger impact on employment. Due to its e¤ects on discounting the future,
increasing exit risk has a similar qualitative e¤ect.
Since employment dynamics in the µ = 0 case are not in‡uenced by the use of temporary
jobs, the Campbell and Fisher (2000) asymmetry e¤ect is strong. Therefore, the model without
temporary jobs is relatively successful in accounting for the variance ratio. This version of the
model does less well at capturing other di¤erences between young and old plants, as creation,
destruction and reallocation are all less volatile at young plants in this version of the model.
With µ = 0:75 temporary jobs are used by a larger number of plants and are used more
intensively at plants that were already relying on them, compared to the calibrated model. This
means that a greater fraction of employment dynamics is governed by plants operating on the
more ‡exible margin. So, increasing µ above its baseline value generally raises overall variability
near the calibrated parameter values. However, this parameter change reduces relative variability
in terms of ratios of gross ‡ow measures. Of course if only temporary jobs are used, then the
model acts like a frictionless representative producer and all asymmetries disappear.
Several other features of this simulation are worth noting. First, the variance ratio uniformly
drops below one. Also notice that having more temporary jobs moves the correlations between
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jobs is countercyclical for this parameterization. Finally, since plants’ use of temporary jobs
reduces the size of the region of inaction, there is less endogenous persistence in this version of
the model.
We now brie‡y discuss some implications of using other values of the relative productivity
parameter, µ: It turns out that a plant’s use of temporary jobs is quite sensitive to changes in
the magnitude of µ. This can be seen by noting that, with all other parameters kept at their
baseline values, if µ < 0:66, then no temporary jobs would be used at all, and if µ > 0:77, then
both new and mature plants would use temporary jobs in both wage states. Since intensity of
temporary job use changes smoothly with µ, the impact of this sensitivity is mitigated in the
implied aggregate employment dynamics. As µ is increased so that both new and mature plants
use temporary jobs, the di¤erences between young and old plants begin to disappear. Higher
productivity uncertainty for new plants lessens the sensitivity of temporary job use to µ: For
example, if ¾n is twice the magnitude of ¾m, then the threshold below which no temporary jobs
are used by new plants is 0:59:
5.4.3. Increasing Idiosyncratic Risk
The next two perturbations of the calibrated versions of the model involve increasing produc-
tivity risk and exit risk at new plants. Panels E and F in Tables 6 and 7 cover these cases.
Comparing the policy intercepts indicated in Table 5 for these cases to the calibrated case, we
see that increasing idiosyncratic risk in these ways has the qualitative e¤ects anticipated above.
For example, when either source of risk is increased, the use of temporary jobs by new plants
increases noticeably relative to the calibrated model. The volatility of gross job ‡ows for both
young and old plants is increased on all dimensions.
Given the cross-industry empirical evidence discussed in Section 2, it is also interesting to
examine how industry-wide job growth depends on overall productivity risk. We can do this by
scaling the variances, ¾n and ¾m, relative to the calibrated model to generate data from model
industries facing di¤erent amounts of risk. Plotting the standard deviation of total employment
growth versus the sum of the job creation and destruction rates’ sample medians produces a
34model analogue of Figure 2. This is done in Figure 9. To generate the data for this …gure, we
used scale factors ranging from 0.8 to 2.4. A circle marks the data from the model’s baseline
calibration. Because we used annual data to construct Figure 2 while our model produces
quarterly data, the two …gures are not strictly comparable. However, Figure 9 does show that
the model economy can replicate the sort of cross-industry observations from Section 2 by only
changing the model’s idiosyncratic risk.
Increasing idiosyncratic risk raises both the standard deviation of employment growth and
the median job creation and destruction rates, so Figure 9 displays a monotone increasing
relationship. The observed relationship is nonlinear. Around the calibrated model, the slope
is approximately 0.25, a number surprisingly close to the slope of the OLS regression line from
Figure 2, 0.17. When idiosyncratic risk is larger and more plants use temporary jobs, the slope
of the risk-variance relationship increases. In the middle of the graph, it is approximately 1.3.
Finally, as idiosyncratic risk increases even further, plants use temporary jobs so intensively that
the industry begins to resemble a representative producer operating a Cobb-Douglas technology.
Microeconomic uncertainty is irrelevant for such an industry, so the relationship between our risk
measure and employment volatility ‡attens. Overall, the …gure displays a considerable impact
of idiosyncratic risk on aggregate uncertainty. Doubling the calibrated value of idiosyncratic
risk increases the standard deviation of aggregate employment growth by more than a factor of
four.
5.4.4. Higher Adjustment Costs and Persistent Wages
When adjustment costs are increased compared to the baseline calibration, Table 5 shows that
the intensity of temporary job usage rises substantially. Now both new and mature plants use
temporary jobs in both wage states. Since the organized creation intercepts are small compared
to the frictionless ones, plants use a lot of temporary jobs. Aggregate dynamics for this case
are summarized in Panel G of Tables 6 and 7. Due to their e¤ect on the use of temporary jobs,
higher adjustment costs amplify ‡uctuations but reduce relative di¤erences in gross job ‡ows
between young and old plants. The impact on overall variability contrasts sharply with the
usual e¤ect of increasing adjustment costs, which is to reduce volatility (this is what happens
35in a version of the calibrated model in which µ = 0.)
A persistent wage process (here the persistence parameter is the calibrated value from Camp-
bell and Fisher (2000), ½ = 0:47) does not change the predictions of the model relative to the
baseline very much, except that it increases the persistence of job growth. Job growth is sim-
ilarly strongly positively autocorrelated at young and old plants in the data. In the baseline
parameterization of the model it is identically negatively autocorrelated at young and old plants.
In a model without adjustment costs and with an i.i.d. wage process, the autocorrelation of
job growth would be ¡0:5. Yet in the baseline case which has this wage process, the mag-
nitude is ¡0:34. The region of inaction is the source of the endogenous persistence indicated
here. It makes plants slow to respond to wage changes on average. When wage changes are
made more persistent (but still negatively autocorrelated in growth rates), employment growth
becomes positively autocorrelated. The best the model can do along this dimension is to as-
sume ½ is near unity so that wage growth is close to i.i.d. In this case the autocorrelation of
employment growth is about 0:5. Additional persistence could be generated by the model if we
assumed a driving process which implied that wage growth was positively autocorrelated, such
as a deterministic sine wave.
5.4.5. Aggregate Technology Shocks
In the simple framework of Section 3, the use of temporary jobs does not necessarily change
aggregate employment dynamics if all shocks simply shift the distribution of productivity and
leave job creation policies unchanged. In the industry model, idiosyncratic risk endogenously
determines both the number of plants which use temporary jobs and the intensity with which
they use them. This provides a natural channel through which idiosyncratic risk can in‡uence
the industry’s dynamics, even if plants’ employment policies are invariant to aggregate shocks.
To see this, consider a version of the model in which an aggregate technology shock drives all
aggregate employment ‡uctuations. The shock follows a random walk in logarithms and multi-
plies zt in the plant’s production function. The aggregate technology innovations have Gaussian
distributions with mean ¹A and variance ¾2
A. In this case the model resembles a standard (S;s)
framework. The scaled employment policies policies are invariant to the shock, and aggregate
36dynamics only re‡ect changes in the mean of the aggregate productivity distribution. Substitu-
tion toward temporary jobs induced by higher idiosyncratic risk can a¤ect aggregate dynamics
because plants adjust employment more frequently. The higher adjustment frequency implies
that a greater fraction of the industry is ready to respond to a given aggregate shock when it
arrives.
We assess this e¤ect in the last perturbation of the calibrated model, Panel I of Tables 6
and 7, where a multiplicative aggregate technology shock drives employment dynamics. We set
the variance of this shock, ¾2
A, to the calibrated variance of the wage shock and constrain its
mean so that there is no drift. When we conduct this experiment using the parameter values
from the baseline calibration, we …nd almost no di¤erence between the dynamics of young
and old plants. This is because young plants …ll very few temporary jobs in the absence of
transitory wage shocks. To demonstrate that the use of temporary jobs can in‡uence aggregate
dynamics by changing the frequency of employment adjustment, we increased ¾n to the value
used to construct Panel E of Tables 6 and 7, 0:831. This change induces new plants to use more
temporary jobs.
This version of the model does roughly as well as or better than the calibrated model, repli-
cating all the data’s second moments except the variance ratio and the closely related growth-
reallocation correlation. The fall in variance ratios is due to the absence of the microeconomic
policy asymmetries discussed in Campbell and Fisher (2000). As expected, this version of the
model vastly overpredicts the rate of job reallocation among new plants. Still, the results are
encouraging since they suggest that many of the model’s desirable characteristics do not depend
on the source of the aggregate shock.
6. Conclusion
Are our results robust to sensible alternative adjustment cost speci…cations? Our analysis em-
phasized the value of the options to create and destroy jobs in the future that kinked adjustment
costs generate. Plant level data from the U.S. show that inaction in employment adjustment is
common, so adjustment cost speci…cations that generate this feature are the empirically relevant
37case. Fixed costs of increasing or decreasing employment, as in Bertolla and Caballero (1990),
are the other prominent adjustment cost speci…cation that generates inaction. We anticipate
that increasing idiosyncratic risk will induce plants to substitute more ‡exible factors for those
that require …xed costs of adjustment. The question of how such policy di¤erences impact
aggregate dynamics in that framework is an open and interesting question.
Macroeconomic interest in models of infrequent employment adjustment centers around their
ability to directly connect microeconomic observations with aggregate ‡uctuations. Neverthe-
less, current models are themselves too stylized to directly confront microeconomic data. For
instance, they counterfactually predict that job creation very rarely follows job destruction.
Empirical characterization of these models with plant-level data has relied on estimation and
simulation using reduced form microeconomic policies, called “adjustment hazard functions” by
Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997), without directly characterizing structural parameters
or optimal policies. Our model with temporary jobs generates a wide variety of employment
paths, some of which are very unlike those in other models of infrequent employment adjust-
ment. For example, plants in our model can quickly reverse job creation and destruction if they
are using temporary jobs. Therefore, the addition of temporary jobs can make infrequent ad-
justment models suitable for structural estimation. Indeed, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borego
(1999) have estimated a model similar to ours using Spanish social security data on plants’ use
of workers with temporary and permanent contracts. A potentially fruitful extension of their
work is the incorporation of aggregate uncertainty. Estimation of such a model using U.S. data
would provide more evidence on the connection between idiosyncratic risk, plants’ employment
policies, and aggregate ‡uctuations.
Our emphasis on producers’ substitution between rigid and ‡exible factors places this paper
in a literature which seeks to understand organizational choices and their impact on ‡exibility.
Jones and Ostroy (1984) de…ne an action as increasing ‡exibility if it lowers the cost of any
future adjustment. Similarly, Athey and Schmutzler (1995) model organizational ‡exibility as a
reduction in adjustment costs resulting from a direct investment. We believe that a more natu-
ral de…nition of organizational ‡exibility focuses directly on producers’ observed dynamics: an
organization is more ‡exible if its observed input choices respond more to a shock of a given size.
38The distinction between these two approaches can be quite stark. If the job destruction cost
in our model is set equal to zero, then increasing a plant’s stock of organized jobs reduces the
cost of attaining any desired level and con…guration of employment in the future, so it increases
‡exibility according to Jones and Ostroy (1984). However, the accumulation of organized jobs
may move the plant into the region of inaction, where it will choose to behave quite rigidly, not
responding to either idiosyncratic or aggregate shocks. For this reason, a de…nition of organiza-
tional ‡exibility that focuses directly on adjustment costs might be unappealing. Consideration
of producers’ substitution between similar factors with di¤erent costs of adjustment provides an
alternative approach to understanding the organization of production and its implications for
observed ‡exibility.
In our industry model, increasing producers’ idiosyncratic risks increases the aggregate em-
ployment response to a given aggregate shock. In the light of this result, an interesting conjec-
ture is that the increase in microeconomic turbulence that we alluded to in the introduction has
caused the U.S. economy to respond more to aggregate disturbances, such as shocks to monetary
policy. To formally evaluate this conjecture, a general equilibrium analysis is clearly desirable.
Campbell and Fisher (2000) demonstrate that our analysis can be recast in a general equilib-
rium environment, but that model makes the strong simplifying assumption that consumers
are risk-neutral. This is an important caveat, because Veracierto (1998) and Thomas (2000)
show that results from models of irreversible and lumpy investment similar to ours that also
abstract from endogenous price determination are not robust. Thomas (2000) emphasizes the
role of consumption smoothing in determining aggregate investment almost independently of
the microeconomic investment technology. Consumption smoothing behavior has no necessary
implications for the elasticity of labor supply, so we expect these considerations to be rela-
tively unimportant when considering the e¤ects of idiosyncratic uncertainty on economy-wide
employment dynamics. Nevertheless, further development of our analysis in general equilibrium
settings is an important task for future research.
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 Eff
e j- f2e ff. ffbD
EffS Eff2 Eff2
Qrwh= +l, Wkh uhsruwhg frh!flhqwv duh iurp uhjuhvvlrqv ri wkh lqglfdwhg ghshqghqw yduldeoh
rq wkh vxp ri mre fuhdwlrq dqg ghvwuxfwlrq*v vdpsoh phgldqv dqg d ixoo vhw ri wzr0gljlw lqgxvwu|
gxpp| yduldeohv1 Wkh qxpehu ehorz hdfk uhsruwhg frh!flhqw lv lwv khwhurvnhgdvwlflw| frqvlvwhqw
vwdqgdug huuru1 +ll, Wkh lqgxvwu| vdpsoh vwdwlvwlfv xvhg iru wkh uhjuhvvlrqv zhuh fdofxodwhg xvlqj
dqqxdo revhuydwlrqv iurp 4<:6 wkurxjk 4<;91 +lll, Wkh vdpsoh vwdqgdug ghyldwlrq ri yduldeoh
f lv e jf/ dqg C/ / (/d q g- / uhihu wr wkh lqgxvwu|*v mre jurzwk udwh/ mre fuhdwlrq udwh/ mre
ghvwuxfwlrq udwh/ dqg mre uhdoorfdwlrq udwh1 +ly, Wkh 779 irxu0gljlw pdqxidfwxulqj lqgxvwulhv
frpsulvhg wkh vdpsoh iru wkhvh uhjuhvvlrqv1 +y, Wkh 667 odujhvw lqgxvwulhv frpsulvhg wkh vdpsoh
iru wklv uhjuhvvlrq1
Wdeoh 7= Edvholqh Fdoleudwlrq
Sdudphwhu Ydoxh Sdudphwhu Ydoxh
k 3199 j? 3184;
q 41380427 j6 31748
S 418 >? 031467
_ 318 >6 0313;9
w 31:  3138
B? 313578 j‘ 31377
B6 313379 4 3Wdeoh 8= Srolf| Lqwhufhswv iru wkh Prgho Sdudphwhul}dwlrqv Frqvlghuhg
Rujdql}hg Lqwhufhswv Whpsrudu|
Qhz Sodqwv Pdwxuh Sodqwv Lqwhufhswv
Sdudphwhul}dwlrq +?E` , +?E` , +?E` ￿ +?E` ￿ +6E` , +6E` , +6E` ￿ +6E` ￿ h +E` , h +E` ￿
Fdoleudwhg 313<; 3184< 313<; 3178: 31456 317<; 31448 31778 3144: 313<4
w 'f 31437 31853 313<; 3178; 31456 317<; 31448 31778 3 3
w 'f  .D 313;5 3184: 313;9 31788 31457 31838 31447 31773 31477 31444
j? 'f  H 31376 31867 31379 31789 31456 317<; 31448 31778 3144: 313<4
B? 'f  feb 313<5 3185: 313<7 31795 31456 317<; 31448 31778 3144: 313<4
S ' _ '  f 31359 31::7 3135: 319;8 3137; 3197; 3137< 318;: 3144: 313<4
4 'f  e. 31433 3185; 313<9 31783 31458 31839 31447 3176< 3144: 313<4
j? 'f  Hcj ‘ 'f c
j ￿'f  fee 31378 317<5 31378 317<5 3144< 317:3 3144< 317:3 31436 31436
Qrwh= Wkh fdoleudwhg sdudphwhuv duh olvwhg lq Wdeoh 71 Iru wkh rwkhu sdudphwhul}dwlrqv doo sdudphwhuv duh ohiw dw wkhlu fdoleudwhg
ydoxhv h{fhsw dv lqglfdwhg/ zlwk rqh h{fhswlrq1 Wkh h{fhswlrq lv wkh cj? 'f  H*f d v hl qz k l f k> ?' f  eD vr wkdw surgxfwlylw|
jurzwk frqwlqxhv wr eh }hur dprqj qhz sodqwv lq h{shfwhg ydoxh1Wdeoh 9= Vwhdg| Vwdwh Jurvv Mre Iorzv lq X1V1 Gdwd dqg lq wkh Prgho
Vwdwlvwlfv+l,
Sodqw W|sh . EC . E .E( .E-
D1 X1V Pdqxidfwxulqj Vhfwru
Doo 03166 816< 81:5 4414
\rxqj 31<8 :185 9189 4714
Rog 031:3 7187 8157 <1;
E1 Edvholqh Fdoleudwlrq+ll,
Doo 3133 8158 8158 4318
\rxqj 5156 ;14; 81<3 4714
Rog 0317: 7198 8145 <1;
F1 Whpsrudu| Mrev Qhyhu Xvhg
Doo 3133 8154 8154 4317
\rxqj 515; :1<: 819< 461:
Rog 0317: 7198 8145 <1::
G1 Whpsrudu| Mrev Pruh Surgxfwlyh
Doo 3133 91:4 91:4 4617
\rxqj 5157 4417 <14; 5319
Rog 0317: 81:6 9153 441<
H1 Kljkhu Surgxfwlylw| Ulvn dw Qhz Sodqwv
Doo 3133 9175 9175 451;
\rxqj 516< 4816 451< 5;15
Rog 03179 71:5 814; <1<
I1 Kljkhu H{lw Ulvn dw Qhz Sodqwv
Doo 3133 8178 8178 431<
\rxqj 5143 <13< 913< 4914
Rog 0317: 7198 8144 <1;
J1 Kljkhu Dgmxvwphqw Frvwv
Doo 3133 441: 441: 5616
\rxqj 5158 4:1< 481: 6619
Rog 03179 4317 431< 5415
K1 Shuvlvwhqw Zdjh Surfhvv
Doo 3133 8158 8158 4318
\rxqj 515; ;14; 81<3 4714
Rog 0317: 7198 8145 <1;
L1 Djjuhjdwh Whfkqrorj| Vkrfn
Doo 3133 9175 9175 451;
\rxqj 516< 4816 451< 5;15
Rog 03179 71:5 814; <1<
Qrwh= +l, .E% ghqrwhv wkh h{shfwhg ydoxh ri yduldeoh % ' Ccc(c- Khuh C ghqrwhv mre jurzwk/
 ghqrwhv wkh udwh ri mre fuhdwlrq/ ( ghqrwhv wkh udwh ri mre ghvwuxfwlrq dqg - ghqrwhv wkh udwh
ri mre uhdoorfdwlrq sdudphwhul}dwlrq1 Wkh qxpehuv iru wkh XV gdwd duh wdnhq iurp Wdeoh 41 +ll,
Sdqhov E0L fruuhvsrqg wr wkh sdudphwhul}dwlrqv ri wkh prgho olvwhg lq Wdeoh 81Wdeoh := Yduldwlrq ri Jurvv Mre Iorzv lq X1V1 Gdwd dqg lq wkh Prgho
Vwdwlvwlfv+l,
Sodqw W|sh jC j￿ j( j- dj(*j￿o
2 4Ec( 4E-cC 4EC|cC |3￿
D1 X1V Pdqxidfwxulqj Vhfwru
Doo 41<3 31;8 4178 4175 51;< 03166 03184 3197
\rxqj 5165 4199 4198 5159 31<< 0313: 031335 3199
Rog 41;4 31:4 4176 4168 7139 03169 03196 3193
E1 Edvholqh Fdoleudwlrq+ll,
Doo 41<3 31;: 4136 3156 4173 031<< 031:3 0316<
\rxqj 619< 513: 4199 4137 3197 031;: 3174 0317:
Rog 4188 3196 31<7 3165 5155 031<< 031<: 03168
F1 Whpsrudu| Mrev Qhyhu Xvhg
Doo 418: 3198 31<5 315; 5134 031<< 031<9 03167
\rxqj 41:3 31;4 31;9 3144 4148 031<< 03185 03167
Rog 4187 3195 31<6 3166 515; 031<< 031<: 03167
G1 Whpsrudu| Mrev Pruh Surgxfwlyh
Doo 9198 61;7 614; 5169 319< 031:< 315< 03183
\rxqj <163 8158 7158 6138 3199 031;4 3167 03183
Rog 9145 6187 51<9 5153 31:3 031:< 315; 03183
H1 Kljkhu Surgxfwlylw| Ulvn dw Qhz Sodqwv
Doo 5176 4149 415< 3166 4157 031<: 03173 03176
\rxqj :13< 61:: 6166 41:3 31:; 031;< 315: 0317<
Rog 41;9 3198 4146 3165 5149 031<< 031<: 03168
I1 Kljkhu H{lw Ulvn dw Qhz Sodqwv
Doo 5137 31<: 413< 3159 4159 031<; 0317: 03174
\rxqj 7176 5185 5134 4175 3196 031;6 316; 0317;
Rog 4188 3195 31<6 3165 5158 031<< 031<: 03167
J1 Kljkhu Dgmxvwphqw Frvwv
Doo 4517 9189 81<; 519: 31;6 031<4 3156 03183
\rxqj 481< ;14: :177 51;6 31;6 031<7 3159 03183
Rog 4419 9155 8198 5194 31;6 031<4 3155 03183
K1 Shuvlvwhqw Zdjh Surfhvv
Doo 41;< 31<3 31<< 3155 4154 031<; 03174 3135
\rxqj 6135 41:; 4167 4144 318: 031:; 3175 03145
Rog 419: 31:6 31<9 315; 41:: 031<; 031;8 313;
L1 Djjuhjdwh Whfkqrorj| Vkrfn
Doo 41;4 4148 31<9 4143 319< 03179 3153 318:
\rxqj 5156 417< 4137 416; 317< 03178 316; 3157
Rog 41:; 31<7 31;8 3155 31;5 031<: 3174 3194
Qrwh= +l, jE% ghqrwhv wkh vwdqgdug ghyldwlrq ri yduldeoh % dqg 4E%c+ ghqrwhv wkh fruuhodwlrq
ehwzhhq yduldeohv % dqg + Iru wkh ghqlwlrqv ri wkh yduldeohv/ vhh Wdeoh 91 Wkh qxpehuv iru wkh
X1V1 gdwd duh iurp Wdeoh 41 +ll, Sdqhov E0L fruuhvsrqg wr wkh sdudphwhul}dwlrqv ri wkh prgho













































Median of Job Creation + Median of Job Destruction
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Frictionless Labor Demand Schedule
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